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Abstract
In recent years, the capabilities of knowledge-based systems to communicate with their users have
evolved from simple interactions to complex dialogues. With this evolution comes a need to
understand what makes a good dialogue. In this paper, we are concerned with dialogue coherence.
We review the notion of focus, which partly explains this property, and its use for user-system
communication. First, we examine the major theories dealing with this notion. We describe what
their contribution is and how they dier. Then, we illustrate the benefits of using the notion of focus
and especially the improvement in text coherence. We pay particular attention to how the notion
can concretely be implemented. Its integration with other techniques and theories is described. We
conclude the paper by pointing out remaining issues in the understanding of the notion of focus. The
contribution of this paper is to provide a classification of the theories of focus and to show the
improvements they oer in elaborate user-system dialogues.
1 Introduction
Since the early days of expert systems, the capabilities of knowledge-based systems to communicate
have greatly improved. For example, explanation has been recognised has a complex task that
requires specific knowledge (Paris etal., 1988; Paris, 1991; Southwick, 1989, 1991; Wick, 1994). As a
result, systems are now able to engage in a dialogue with their users. Our research leads us also to
consider how these capabilities can be used for requirements elicitation systems (Lecœuche et al.,
1998). Communication is indeed beginning to play a more and more central role in these systems.
The emphasis is on guiding the users through the whole elicitation process (Rolland, 1993, 1994).
This involves participating in a coherent dialogue with the users. This dialogue should enable them
to readily understand what the system wants to elicit. In Example 1, a system which is eliciting
information about a World Wide Web site directs the users’ attention to the navigation between
pages before asking its question. This helps the user in following the system reasoning.
A set of rules accounting for easily intelligible dialogues is needed to provide such a dialogue.
Thus, constructing full discourses requires more knowledge than the sentence long utterances of
early systems because relations between sentences must be considered (Mann et al., 1981; Grice,
1975, p. 46). Not taking this point into account leads to disconnected discourses that are dicult to
Example 1
Let’s see how pages are linked together. Do you want to link all the pages to the site home
page ?
. . .
understand. Users usually presume that the computer will produce coherent text. If this is not the
case, they will waste their time in trying to understand why sentences are put together as they are.
In this paper, we review one set of discourse rules. Focus rules define dialogue coherence in terms
of focus and focus shifts1: the focus of a dialogue can only change in some well defined ways. The
rules operate at dierent levels, from word selection up to global dialogue structure, and are based
on dierent concepts, such as dialogue purpose and ‘‘real-world’’ organisation. Although they are
necessary for producing coherent text, focus rules have often been ignored in the generation of
dialogues.
We also present applications making use of these rules. These examples provide evidence that the
notion of focus is mature enough to provide real improvements in the production of dialogues and
their understanding by users.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we review the major theories that explain the
notion of focus. We first define the notion of focus and distinguish between global focus and local
focus, reflecting the level of focus considered by the theories. Then we describe the theories in more
detail and we classify them by the kind of information they use to keep track of the focus. In Section
3, we illustrate the notion of focus with applications demonstrating its use and its usefulness. We pay
particular attention to how the notion of focus can concretely be implemented. Its integration with
other techniques and theories, such as explanation strategy selection and rhetorical structure theory,
is described. In Section 4, we point out open issues in the understanding of the notion of focus.
These are important for the actual use of the notion but have not yet been fully researched. Finally,
we conclude in Section 5 with some thoughts on the future use of the notion of focus in user-system
dialogues.
2 Theory
A great deal of work is related to the notion of focus. In this paper we present theories that (1) are
general enough to explain a wide range of focus-related linguistic phenomena (2) have direct
implications for knowledge-based system communication. The presentation is organised along two
criteria. The first distinguishes between global and local focus theories. (The definitions of global
focus and local focus are given in the next section). The second dierentiates the theories according
to the knowledge they use to keep track of the focus. We distinguish between ‘‘real world’’ based
theories, ‘‘participant’’ based theories and dialogue based theories. In ‘‘real world’’ based theories,
focus evolution is mainly constrained by properties of the external environment (e.g. task to be
achieved, structure of the objects spoken about). In ‘‘participant’’ based theories, focus evolution is
mainly constrained by some properties of the dialogue participants (e.g. their intentions or beliefs).
In dialogue based theories, focus evolution is mainly constrained by the previous dialogue.
This classification is summarised in Table 1.
2.1 Definitions
We define the focus as being the set of all the things to which participants in a dialogue are attending at
a certain point in a dialogue and the point of view they have on these things. The things represent what
is focused on. They can be concrete or abstract and they can either be explicitly mentioned in the
dialogue or they can be implicit. The point of view represent how the things are focused on. It
depends on the dialogue history.
For example, imagine a conversation where the US military strength in general is discussed. The
conversation then evolves to the Star War project and its funding. The focus of this conversation
could be represented as in Figure 1. The things in focus are what has been discussed while the point
1These terms have been used extensively in the literature with varying meanings. We use them here informally.
Focus should be understood as being the things to which the user is attending. A precise definition will be given
in the next section.
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of view depends on the dialogue history. (The funding is seen from the Star Wars project perspective
and is related to the overall issue of the US military strength.)
Focus represents the conversational context in which future utterances are interpreted. If the new
sentences cannot be interpreted with respect to the focus, the discourse will seem incoherent. A
dialogue can be coherent or incoherent at several levels. For example, the dialogue in Example 2 is
incoherent at the sentence level: the two sentences do not seem to focus on the same topic. In
Example 3, the dialogue is incoherent at a higher level: the last paragraph, although internally
coherent, doe not fit with the preceding conversation.
These dierent levels of coherence are reflected in the distinction between global focus and local
focus (McKeown, 1985a, p. 56). On the one hand, local focus, also called immediate focus, deals
with sentence level coherence (Sidner, 1983, p. 107). It explains how two consecutive sentences are
related. Global focus, on the other hand, deals with higher-level coherence (Grosz, 1977, p. 5). It
explains how parts of the dialogue are related. As we shall see, distinguishing between these two
kinds of focus is necessary because they obey dierent sets of rules.
We review now these two notions in turn.
Table 1 Classification of focus theories and corresponding sections
Focus Theories section 2
Global focus theories section 2.2
‘‘Real world’’ based theories
Task based theories section 2.2.1
Domain based theories section 2.2.2
‘‘Participant’’ based theories
Intention based theories section 2.2.3
Memory based theories section 2.2.4
Dialogue based theories
Dialogue move based theories section 2.2.5
Local focus theories section 2.3
‘‘Real world’’ based theories
Domain based theories section 2.3.4
‘‘Participant’’ based theories
Semantics based theories section 2.3.3
Dialogue based theories
Sentence form based theories section 2.3.1
Dialogue move based theories section 2.3.2
Figure 1 Focus definition (adapted from McCoy and Cheng, 1991, p. 109).
Example 2 (from Schank, 1977, p. 421)
A: I just bought a new hat.
B: Fred eats hamburgers.
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2.2 Global focus
In this section, the global focus theories are classified according to the kind of knowledge they use to
keep track of the focus. We distinguish between theories based on ‘‘real world’’ properties such a
task structure and domain structure, theories based on participants’ properties such as intentions or
memory limitations, and theories based on dialogue properties such as dialogue moves.
The theories are presented in order of complexity; later theories usually extending previous ones.
For each category, we have selected a main piece of work representing it, preferring work that has
been used for implementing dialogue management systems.
2.2.1 Based on task structure: Grosz (1977)
In this approach, the focus is divided into focus spaces organised as a stack. A focus space represents
the information in focus during part of the dialogue. It is divided into two components. The first
component is the explicit focus. It contains the objects and events that have been mentioned during
that discourse part. The second component is the implicit focus. It contains objects and events
related to the elements in explicit focus but not directly mentioned in the discourse. Recording both
types of elements is important as the dialogue can refer to objects or events in explicit or implicit
focus as shown in Example 4. In this example, the explicit focus only contains references to the lid,
the container and the action of attaching them together. However, the bolts are put in implicit focus
because they are related to the action of attaching the lid to the container. Therefore the reference to
them is easily understood.
The top-most space in the stack is the active space. It contains the elements that are in focus at the
current point in the dialogue. When a new topic is discussed, a new space is pushed on the stack and
therefore becomes active. The other spaces are open spaces. They contain information about
previous topics that have not yet been completed. This information is still available for reference in
the dialogue but is less accessible than the information in the active space. The open spaces can
become active again as the dialogue evolves and shifts back to uncompleted issues. This is shown in
Figure 2. In this example, Space 0 is pushed on top of the existing spaces. It contains elements that
are then more salient in the discourse than the elements of the open spaces. Then it is popped and
Space 1 becomes active again.
Grosz used this framework to study the global focus in conversations between an expert and an
apprentice assembling part of a compressor. She found that the movements of the focus, i.e. the
stacking and un-stacking of focus spaces, mirror the structure of the task discussed (Grosz, 1977,
Example 3 (from Sidner, 1983, pp. 111–112, 127–128)
B: How do you teach your students to use a calculator ?
A: I think students should use a calculator for a while. I give them problems to solve with it,
and when they have trouble, I answer their questions about the problems.
B: That’s all well and good, but I think they need more instruction on the device to reduce
the number of questions. Instead I give them instructions, and they use these to solve
problems. They don’t have much trouble learning to use the machine.
C: Well, I think you are both wrong. Here’s why. I’m going on a vacation to Tahiti
tomorrow. I’m going by plane, and I’ll be there about a week. It is going to cost me a bundle
of money.
Example 4 (from Grosz, 1977, p. 68)
S: Attach the lid to the container.
R: Where are the bolts?
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pp. 104–105). A new focus space is pushed on the stack whenever a new task begins. The focus space
is then used for reference during the realisation of the task. It is finally popped from the stack when
the task is completed. For example, if completion of Task 1 requires completion of Task 0, a space
for Task 1 will first be pushed on the stack. Then a space for Task 0 will be pushed as this subtask is
dealt with. Then it will be popped and Task 1 space will become active again. This corresponds to
the stack movements in Figure 2.
The stack movements are reflected in the dialogue by dierent means. Pushing a new space is
usually indicated by a sentence that refers to the goal or the objects involved in the new task.
Popping a space is usually marked by references to elements in an open space of the stack. The stack
is then popped so that the open space referred to becomes the active focus space again. Recognition
of topic shifts is also helped by the task structure shared by the participants: the hearer knows when
to expect a shift.
As new elements are included into a focus space, an important question is to know what implicit
information should be added, since this information can influence focus shifts. Grosz proposes two
principles (Grosz, 1977, pp. 67–68):
. for physical objects, add the subparts of the objects;
. for events, add the sub-events as well as their participants.
Although similar choices are also made in other theories, no explanation is given to back it up.
A number of problems remain open in this theory (Grosz, 1981). Notably, the relation between
focus and belief is not clear. Speaker and hearer may have dierent knowledge of the concepts
spoken about in the dialogue. Therefore they may focus dierently on them (Levelt, 1989, pp. 119–
120). This is not reflected in the theory where a unique focus space is used. This is because focus is
seen as ‘‘a property of the discourse itself, not of the discourse participants’’ (Grosz and Sidner,
1986, p. 179). Using two spaces, one for the speaker and one for the hearer, would require one to
study issues such as how the two are synchronised and how the speaker’s belief about the hearer’s
focus influences the dialogue.
2.2.2 Based on domain structure: Linde (1979)
Linde’s approach is very similar to that of Grosz. The focus representation is identical but the shifts
depend upon the domain structure rather than on the tasks to be carried out (although there is an
overlap between the two).
Linde used her framework to study the global focus in descriptions of apartments. She found that
the movements of the focus are based on the apartment layout. The descriptions begin with the
entrance hall and then describe each room in turn as if the speaker was walking through the
apartment.
This approach first shows that the task structure is not the only organisation influencing the focus
moves. Domain structure is another possibility. This is confirmed by Levelt (1989, pp. 142–143).
Levelt observed that people describing a simple spatial configuration consisting of linked nodes use
it to structure their discourse. In particular, they follow the ‘‘principle of connectivity’’ choosing as
the next node to describe one that is linked to the latest node presented. When people have to come
Figure 2 Examples of stack movements. Space 0 becomes the new active space. Then it is popped and Space 1
becomes active again.
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back to a previous node because they reach a dead-end, they do it by returning to the nearest choice
point not explored. Levelt calls this the ‘‘stack principle’’, which also confirms Linde’s theory.
A second point made by Linde is that the task or domain structures are not sucient to determine
the focus moves done in the dialogue. For example, if a room R1 leads to two others, R2 and R3,
two possible focus moves are possible: R1 to R2 or R1 to R3. Choosing between these choices
depends on criteria independent of the domain structure, such as the intention of the speaker in
describing the apartments. This means that the focus shifts reflect the dialogue organisation. Focus
shifts reflect the domain structure (or task structure) in so far as it constrains the dialogue
organisation (by the principle of connectivity for example). In his experiment with a simple layout,
Levelt found that people tend to minimise their cognitive load by describing simpler parts first, i.e.
the ones that require less backtracking. However, it not clear how this applies to more complex
layouts.
2.2.3 Based on dialogue intentions: Grosz and Sidner (1986)
Grosz and Sidner propose to divide up the dialogue according to the aims of its parts and to base the
shifts on this division, rather than on a task or domain structure.
The basic focus mechanism is again similar to that of Grosz’s original work. The focus space,
however, not only contains the concepts spoken about but also the ‘‘discourse segment purpose’’
(DSP) (Grosz and Sidner, 1986, p. 179). The DSP represents the intention of a particular part of the
discourse. DSPs form a structure organised by two relations: dominance and satisfaction-precedes.
Dominance means that the completion of one discourse segment contributes to the completion of
the dominant discourse segment. Satisfaction-precedes means that the first discourse purpose must
be completed before the second can be satisfied. For example, if you intend to open a door, you may
first intend me to tell you where the keys are and then you may intend to unlock the door. There is a
dominance relation between the intention of opening the door and the intentions of finding the keys
and opening the door. There is a satisfaction-precedance between the intention of finding the keys
and the intention of opening the door.
The focus shifts are then dependent on the intentional structure of the dialogue: ‘‘a push [on the
focus stack] occurs when the DSP of a new segment contributes to the DSP of the immediately
preceding segment. When the DSP contributes to some intention higher in the dominance hierarchy,
several focus spaces are popped from the stack before the new one is inserted’’ (Grosz and Sidner,
1986, p. 180).
An advantage of this approach is that it bases the focus shifts on dialogue intentions and not on
structures that are only indirectly related to the dialogue organisation (see Section 2.2.2).
A major diculty with this approach is the need to recognise a speaker’s intention to determine
the appropriate shift of focus (dominance or satisfaction-precedes). This implies that the speaker
should provide enough information for the hearer to find out the correct focus shift at the start of a
discourse segment. Three main kinds of information can be used to determine how the DSP of a new
segment relates to the previous one: cue words, i.e. special phrases indicating a particular shift,
utterance-level intentions and general world knowledge (Grosz and Sidner, 1986, p. 188). Since cue
words do not require inferences and can be put at the beginning of a new segment, they often
indicate focus shifts. Grosz and Sidner propose dierent cue words for dominance push, satisfac-
Table 2 Cue words (from Grosz and Sidner, 1986, p. 198)
Focus shift Cue words
dominance push for example, to wit, first, second, and, moreover, furthermore, therefore, finally
satisfaction-precedes push in the first place, first, second, finally, moreover, furthermore
pop anyway, but anyway, in any case, now back to, the end, ok, fine
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tion-precedes push, and pop2. These cue words are summarised in Table 2. Recognition of focus
shifts thanks to utterance-level intentions or general world knowledge is more complex and not yet
fully understood.
2.2.4 Based on memory limitations: Walker (1996b)
Walker points out that stack based theories (see Sections 2.2.1, 2.2.2 and 2.2.3) do not include
‘‘constraints related to the length, depth, or the amount of processing required for an embedded
segment’’ (Walker, 1996, p. 256). In other words, when a segment is popped from the stack, the
previous segment information becomes immediately available again regardless of the popped
segment length. This seems unlikely given people’s memory limitations (Miller, 1956). The longer
the intervening segment is, the less likely previous segment information will still be available3.
Therefore, Walker models focus by a cache rather than by a stack. The main characteristics of the
cache are (Walker, 1993, p. 33+):
1. The elements pushed more recently in the cache are more likely to be retrieved.
2. The elements pushed more frequently in the cache are more likely to be retrieved.
3. Elements are never explicitly popped from the cache but may be displaced. Displaced elements go
to main memory. They can later be recalled to the cache if need be.
Because dialogue elements have dierent importance, priority levels are assigned to them. For
example, elements related to the current topic or to a previous point that is not closed are assigned a
higher priority level since we expect to continue speaking about them. Elements are then displaced
from the cache by priority level order. This explains why we can ‘‘keep in mind’’ information that
will be useful when returning to a previous topic (Guindon, 1985).
The advantages of Walker’s theory over stack based theories are:
1. A better account of how focused elements are kept salient for some time after their related
dialogue segment is closed (Walker, 1997). In the stack model, elements are immediately
popped.
2. An explanation for ‘‘information redundant units’’ (IRU) (Walker, 1996a). These units are so
called because they reintroduce information already expressed in the dialogue. Walker argues
that one of the roles of these units is to indicate that some elements should be put back into focus,
i.e. transfered from main memory to cache. Stack based theories do not oer any explanations
for IRU.
However, it is not clear how elements in the cache are prioritised. Recognition of the speaker’s
intention seems necessary (Walker, 1996). This encounters the same problems as for task based
theories (see Section 2.2.3).
2.2.5 Based on dialogue moves: Reichman (1985)
This theory has three interesting features: (1) dierent kinds of focus spaces are distinguished,
(2) various dialogue moves are used to navigate between spaces and these moves are constrained by
the previous dialogue, and (3) focus spaces have activation levels. We review now these three points
in more detail:
1. A first feature of Reichman’s work is the use of dierent focus spaces depending on the nature of
the discourse. For example, during debative discourses, issue spaces and support spaces are
2Grosz and Sidner take into account some other relations between discourse segments such as digression or
feedback. We do not consider them here.
3This problem also arises in Reichman’s theory (see section 2.2.5). For example, the length of an interruption
should be taken into account when returning to the initial space. However, because Reichman’s theory includes
local focus rules changing the return space information focus level (see section 2.3.2) the problem has less
impact than for stack based theories.
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used. Dierentiating various spaces allows one to record not only the elements in focus and the
intention of a discourse part, as in Grosz and Sidner’s work, but also specific information related
to the particular type of discourse taking place. For instance, an issue space lists, among other,
what kind of issue (epistemic, evaluative, deontic) is under discussion and its topic. A support
space on the other hand contains information such as the source of the support, or its credentials.
Using a richer representation framework to record specific information about each space allows
a finer evaluation of the moves that can take place in the dialogue.
2. A second feature of Reichman’s work is the dierentiation of several conversational moves to
explain shifts in focus. A conversational move is defined as a ‘‘communicative act serving a
new discourse role’’ (Reichman, 1984, p. 163). In other words, a conversational move
provokes a focus shift. Reichman proposes several conversational moves such as interruption
and return among others (Reichman, 1978, pp. 292–298). Each move is defined by a set of
preconditions determining when it can apply, and a set of actions defining the result of its
application. For example, if a participant defends a claim by making an analogy, a possible
move is to challenge this support by expressing doubts on the validity of the analogy mapping.
The precondition of this move is that indeed an analogy has been made and its result is to
undermine the claim’s support (leading to a counter-challenge or to the concession of the
inadequacy of the analogy).
A set of clue words indicates the moves taken in the dialogue. Some of the conversational
moves and their associated cue words are summarised in Table 3.
3. A final feature of Reichman’s work is the recording of a focus space’s level of activation. In stack-
based theories, the spaces nearer the top of the stack are in higher focus. Spaces not in focus are
popped from the stack. Reichman’s framework is more complex. Focus spaces are not placed
into a stack but assigned a focus level. The focus level has one of the following values (Reichman,
1985, p. 54):
Active indicates the unique space where the current utterances are placed. It has the same
meaning as the active space in Grosz’s stack framework.
Controlling indicates the unique space to which the active space is related. Only the elements of
the controlling and active spaces can be spoken about in the dialogue.
Open indicates a previously active space that has not been completed. Open spaces are candidates
for focus shifts as in the Grosz stack framework.
Generating indicates a space in an indirect relation to the active space. For example, an issue
space created when a support space is active would become active while the support space
would be reassigned a generating focus level.
Closed indicates a space whose conversational move has been completed. Closed focuses are not
deleted and may be reopened if necessary (although this is not expected).
Superseded indicates a previously active space that has not been completed but that is not
expected to become active again.
Table 3 Conversational moves (from Reichman, 1984, p. 180)
Conversational move Clue word(s)
Support Because. . . ; Like. . . ; Like when. . .
Restatement and/or conclusion of point being supported So. . .
Interruption Incidentally. . . ; By the way. . .
Return to previously interrupted context space Anyway. . . ; In any case. . .
Indirect challenge Yes/Right but. . . ; Except, however. . .
Direct challenge (No) But. . .
Subargument concession All right/Okay but. . .
Prior logical abstraction But look/listen/you see. . .
Further development Now. . .
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Conversational moves modify the focus level of the focus spaces. When a space becomes active, the
focus levels of all the focus spaces related to it are reassigned new values depending on their relations
with the new active space. For example, an interruption move creates a new focus space, assigns an
active level to it and assigns an open level to the previously active space since this space is not
related, directly or indirectly, to the new active space (Reichman, 1981, pp. 52, 100). At the same
time a return move is put into an expectation list. It then has a higher priority to apply than other
moves since an interruption should come back to the interrupted space4. At the end of the
interruption, the expected return move closes the interruption space and re-assigns an active level
to the suspended space. The use of the various focus levels as well as the expectation list makes the
framework richer than the stack approach.
A possible problem with this approach is the ability to re-open closed focus spaces. As a result,
clauses that are far apart in the dialogue can be put into the same space although the context of the
dialogue may have changed. Polanyi proposes that closed spaces should remain closed. Related
material should be put in a new space which is then explicitly linked with the closed space if need be
(Polanyi, 1985). The focus evolution is then closer to the dialogue structure (which is also the case
for stack-based approaches).
2.2.6 Summary
Compared with the earlier theories of focus, we can notice in more recent theories an evolution
towards richer representations. The representation has been extended along three lines:
. It provides a better account of the role of intention in focusing. This is exemplified in Grosz and
Sidner’s theory (see Section 2.2.3) where the focus shifts are dependent on the discourse
participants’ intentions.
. It provides a finer description of the dialogue structure. This is exemplified in Reichman’s theory
(see Section 2.2.5) where numerous dialogue moves, with their preconditions and eects, are
identified.
. It provides a better model of human information processing. This is exemplified by Walker’s
theory (see Section 2.24).
These extensions take into account dialogue properties as well as ‘‘real world’’ properties such as
task or domain structures (see Table 1). They are also more realistic by recognising human
limitations.
This evolution is accompanied with diculties. For example, taking intention into account is a
dicult task because it implies the capability to recognise speaker’s intentions which is a complex
problem. To achieve this task, Grosz and Sidner proposes the notion of shared plan between the
dialogue participants (Grosz and Sidner, 1990; Grosz and Lochbaum, 1993). Knowing what has to
be done enables them to decide when a shift occurs. The second line of improvement does not
encounter such problems. Recognising a dialogue move is usually easier than recognising an
intention because dialogue moves are more constrained. In other words, only a few moves can
possibly apply at any point in a dialogue. However, while recognition of focus shifts is made easier,
the generation of dialogue is not fully specified by these theories. Speaker’s intentions should, at
some point in the dialogue production process, play a role. Further progress in understanding this
problem would require the study of the relation between intentions and dialogue moves in more
detail. This relation may be a complex one since intentions and discourse relations are not mapped
one-to-one in general (Moore and Paris, 1993, p. 667).
4This rule could be considered as modelling more than just how focus evolves but also how the dialogue is
structured. However, since this structure is based on focus expectation, we consider it as being part of the focus
theory. This is dierent from RST relations, discussed later in the paper, because these relations are not based
on focus. Although they propose an account of text coherence, these relations are therefore not part of focus
theories (some attempts have been made to link RST and Grosz and Sidner’s theory (Moser and Moore, 1995).
However, they mainly concern the intentional aspect of the theories and not the attentional one).
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A number of open issues remain even in the newer theories (Grosz, 1981):
. What is the relation between focus and perspective? People usually focus on concepts from a
certain point of view (McCoy, 1988). This not reflected in the focus space where entities are in
focus or not. A finer representation is required to reflect this phenomenon. Accordingly, finer
shifting rules are required to allow only shifts that are compatible with the perspective taken.
. When is a reference in focus? The focus mechanism is an on-o one. It is not clear when to
consider an inexact referring phrase to still refer to a focused entity or to consider it as a new
entity and maybe shift the focus based on that assumption.
2.3 Local focus
In this subsection we describe theories of local focus, i.e. theories explaining fine-grained coherence.
The theories are classified according to the kind of knowledge they use to keep track of the focus.
We again distinguish between theories based on ‘‘real world’’ properties such as domain structure,
theories based on participants’ properties such as their cultural background, and theories based on
dialogue properties such as sentence form and dialogue moves.
2.3.1 Based on sentence form: Sidner (1979) and Centering (Grosz et al., 1995)
These two major theories are very similar and based on the same ideas. We first present their
commonalities before describing them in turn.
Common ideas
These two theories of local focus explain the coherence between consecutive sentences based on the
syntactic, grammatical and thematic functions of the concepts in the sentences. Each concept is
assigned a focus level depending on its function. These levels then constrain the construction of the
next sentence in the dialogue. This sentence sets, in turn, new focus levels that are used to constrain
the following one, and the process recurs.
More formally, each sentence, except the first sentence of a dialogue, has a main element with
respect to the previous sentence. This element is called the sentence focus. The first sentence of a
dialogue does not have a focus because a sentence on its own does not have one. For example, if I
say: ‘‘I bought a new hat at the shop round the corner yesterday’’, the sentence could be about me
(‘‘I am going to a wedding’’), about the hat (‘‘It is nice, isn’t it’’) or about the shop (‘‘It is amazing
what they have in the store’’). The focus is defined by the relation between two sentences, i.e. the focus
of a sentence is a concept which is echoed from a previous one. Each sentence also has a list of
potential focuses composed of the other concepts present in the sentence. The list is ordered by
decreasing focus level.
The focus and the potential focus list are used to determine the focus of the next sentence. In other
words, if we slide a window spanning two sentences over the dialogue, the first sentence in the
window sets expectations on what the focus will be, based on the current focus and the new concepts
introduced, and these expectations are confirmed, or not, by the other sentence.
The two theories dier in the way focus is represented, in the way focus levels are assigned to the
sentence components and in the way these levels constrain the construction of the next sentence.
We present them now in turn.
Sidner’s Theory
In this approach, two focuses are maintained: (1) the discourse focus, which has been discussed
above, and (2) the actor focus which is the subject of the sentence. This distinction helps finding the
focuses in discourses where the actor focus and the discourse focus are distinct but are both
pronominalised as in Example 55. In this example, the actor focus is Jerome and the discourse focus
is his pigeon.
5A major use of this theory is indeed the resolution of pronoun references.
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When these focuses change in the course of the dialogue, they are stacked in two separate stacks.
Therefore, it is possible to come back to a previous focus by un-stacking either stack.
As explained in the preceding introduction, the most important points in the theory are the
assignments of a focus level to the concepts in a sentence, the computation of the expected focus and
its confirmation or rejection. We now describe these three points.
The focus level assignments are done in a first step. During this step, the potential focus list, which
contains the sentence elements ordered by decreasing focus level, is computed by the following rules
(for the first sentence of the dialogue, special rules apply since there is no existing focus (Sidner,
1983, pp. 287, 297)):
1. If a cleft6 or pseudo-cleft7 sentence is used, the potential focus list is the cleft item if and only if
the element in non-clifting position co-specifies the focus. When it does not the sentence is
incoherent.
2. The potential focus list is composed of the concepts filling a thematic relation in the sentence,
excluding the agent position8 and the noun phrase which co-specifies the focus if one exists. The
last member of the list is the sentence verb phrase.
The determination of the expected focus is then based on the current focus, the potential focus list
and the next sentence form, since the focus is defined by the relation between two sentences. It is
performed by the following algorithm (adapted from Sidner, 1983, pp. 292–294):
1. If the next sentence contains a do-anaphor9 choose the last element of the potential focus list, i.e.
the verb phrase, as the focus. Stack the current focus in the focus stack. Halt.
2. If there is an anaphor co-specifying the current focus, i.e. a word such as a pronoun referring to
the current focus, and another co-specifying some member of the potential focus list, retain the
current focus as focus if the anaphor is not in agent position. If it is, take the potential focus list
member as the new focus and stack the current focus in the focus stack. Halt.
3. If there are anaphors which co-specify only the current focus, retain the current focus as focus.
Halt.
4. If there are anaphors which co-specify only a member of the potential focus list, move the focus
to it. If several members are co-specified, choose the one with the highest focus level. Stack the
current focus in the focus stack. Halt.
5. If there are anaphors which co-specify only a member of the focus stack, move the focus to the
stack member by popping the stack. Halt.
6. If there are no anaphors co-specifying any of the current focus, potential focus list member or
Example 5 (from Sidner, 1983, p. 282)
Jerome took his pigeon out on a leash.
Since he was trying to train it,
he hollered ‘‘heel’’ and ‘‘run’’ at it,
as they sauntered along.
6A ‘‘cleft’’ sentence has the following form: It is/was NP that VP. For example, ‘‘It is John that ate the
strawberries’’ is a cleft sentence.
7A ‘‘pseudo-cleft’’ sentence has the following form: What VP is/was NP. For example, ‘‘What John ate was the
strawberries’’ is a pseudo-cleft sentence.
8The ‘‘agent’’ of a sentence is the thing that is described as being the cause or having the control of the event
presented. For example, in ‘‘I have joined the KBS group’’, I am the agent of the sentence.
9An anaphor is an expression which refers to or stands for another word or words. In ‘‘I like ice-cream. It is
good.’’, ‘‘it’’ is an anaphor standing for ‘‘ice-cream’’. A ‘‘do-anaphor’’ is a special kind of anaphor which has
the following form: To do so/it is/was NP. For example ‘‘I went hill climbing yesterday. To do it is a lot of fun.’’
is a do-anaphor.
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focus stack member but the current focus can fill a non-obligatory case in the sentence or if the
verb phrase is related to the current focus by pronominalisation, retain the current focus as focus.
Halt.
7. If there are no foci mentioned, retain the current focus as focus.
Finally, the expected focus can be rejected if it is grammatically or semantically incorrect. For
example, a pronoun referring to the focus and the focus should agree in gender and number. If no
such incoherence exists, the expected focus becomes the current focus; otherwise the preceding
algorithm is run again to find the second best expected focus.
A final point to consider in this approach is the use of the actor focus and its interaction with the
discourse focus.
Tracking actor focus is much simpler than tracking the discourse focus. The actor focus is
indicated by the subject of the sentence. If the subject is a pronoun, it refers to the current actor
focus except if the discourse focus is animate and is established earlier in the discourse than the actor
focus. In that case the discourse focus takes precedence (Sidner, 1983, p. 307). More complex
interactions are explained in Sidner (1979), but we do not consider them here.
We show now on a small example how this algorithm works (see Example 6).
Centring Theory
In this approach the actor focus is no longer distinguished from the discourse focus and the
algorithms used to order the potential focus list and select the expected focus are modified to take
this dierence into account13. The potential focus list is now ordered by the following rules:
. A sentence subject is ranked higher than its objects.
. Objects are ranked higher than the other elements.
Several focus transitions between consecutive sentences are also defined (Grosz et al., 1995, p.
210):
. Continuation the focus of sentence n+1 is the same as the focus of sentence n
(CbSn1  CbSn) and is also the most highly ranked element of sentence n+1 potential
focus list (CbSn1  CpSn1). In that case, it is likely to be the focus of sentence n+2.
. Retaining the focus of sentence n+1 is the same as the focus of sentence n (CbSn1  CbSn)
Example 6 (adapted from Grosz, 1995, p. 214)
a. John has been acting quite odd.
AF10 = John, PFL11= fJohn, acting oddg, Focus = John12
b. He called up Mike yesterday.
AF = John, PFL= fMike, calling upg, Focus = John (rule 7 and actor focus rule)
c. Mike was studying for his driver’s test.
AF = Mike, PFL = fdriver’s test, Mike, studyingg, Focus = Mike (rule 4 because ‘‘his’’
cannot specify John for semantic reasons)
d. He was annoyed by John’s call.
AF=Mike, PFL=fMike, call, being annoyedg, Focus =Mike (rule 7 and actor focus rule)
10Actor Focus.
11Potential Focus List.
12For the first sentence the focus is by default the first element of the PFL.
13The terminology used in the centering theory diers from Sidner’s theory. The focus of a sentence is called its
backward-looking center (Cb). The PFL is called the set of forward-looking centers (Cf). The most highly
ranked element of Cf is called the preferred forward-looking center (Cp). We will use Sidner’s terminology
when pointing out the similarities and dierences between the theories.
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but is not the most highly ranked element of sentence n+1 potential focus list
(CbSn1 6 CpSn1). In that case it is unlikely to be the focus of sentence n+2.
. Shifting the focus of sentence n is not the same as that of sentence n+1 (CbSn1 6 CbSn).
These transitions are summarised in Table 4.
These transitions and the potential focus list (Cf) are used to select the expected focus by applying
two new rules (Grosz et al., 1995, p. 214):
Rule 1 if any element of the potential focus list of sentence n is realised by a pronoun in sentence
n+1, then the focus of sentence n+1 must also be realised by a pronoun.
Rule 2 Sequences of continuation transitions should be preferred over sequences of retaining
transitions. These sequences should themselves be preferred over sequences of shifting transi-
tions.
These rules constrain what the focus can be in several ways. In text understanding for example, rule 1
restricts the focus to the elements realised by pronouns (if any). In text generation, rule 2 provides
constraints on what can be said next depending on the current focus (see Section 3).
This approach is now applied on a small example (see Example 7). Although the PFL is dierent
from the one computed in Example 6, this theory finds similar results to that of Sidner.
Extension of the Centring Theory An extension of the centering theory has been proposed in
Brennan et al. (1987) by remarking that the shifting transition can be refined into two transitions:
. A smooth-shift transition holds when the focus of sentence n+1 is not the same as the focus of
sentence n (CbSn1 6 CbSn) but is the most highly ranked element of sentence n+1 potential
focus list (CbSn1  CpSn1).
. A rough-shift transition holds when the focus of sentence n+1 is not the same as the focus of
sentence n (CbSn1 6 CbSn) and is not the most highly ranked element of sentence n+1
potential focus list either (CbSn1 6 CpSn1).
These transitions are summarised in Table 5.
The transition ranking becomes (see rule 2 of the centering theory): Continuing > Retaining >
Smooth-Shift > Rough-Shift. Making this finer distinction is useful for the resolution of pronoun
references in some dialogues. For example, in the following dialogue, the centering theory cannot
Table 4 Transitions in centering theory
CbSn1  CbSn CbSn1 6 CbSn
CbSn1  CpSn1 Continuing
Shifting
CbSn1 6 CpSn1 Retaining
Example 7 (adapted from Grosz et al., 1995, p. 214)
a. John has been acting quite odd.
Cf= fJohng, Cp = John
b. He called up Mike yesterday.
Cb = John, Cf= fJohn,Mikeg, Cp = John
c. Mike was studying for his driver’s test.
Cb =Mike, Cf= fMike, driver’s testg, Cp =Mike, Shifting
d. He was annoyed by John’s call.
Cb =Mike, Cf=fMike, call, Johng, Cp =Mike, Continuation
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predict the references in the last sentence (see Example 8) but the extended theory can (see Example
9). The finer distinction also provides finer constraints for text generation.
Common problems
There are a number of remaining problems with Sidner’s theory and the centering theory (more are
given in Walker et al. (1997b)):
. As they are purely based on sentence form, semantic incoherence is not detected. Example 2 (see
Section 2.1) is not considered as being particularly incoherent. Detecting semantic incoherence
would require one to reason about the meaning of the sentences. Sidner proposes to add a
reasoning module with the sole purpose of accepting or rejecting the propositions made by the
focusing algorithm (thus having a limited search space to explore), but such a module has not yet
been implemented.
. The relation between global and local focus is not clearly explained by the theories (Grosz and
Sidner, 1995). The consequences of global shifts on the local focus remain unknown. Nor do we
know the interaction between local focus pops, which are in fact non-local actions, and global
focus.
These two problems are partly tackled by the following theories.
Table 5 Transitions in centering theory extension
CbSn1  CbSn CbSn1 6 CbSn
CbSn1  CpSn1 Continuing Smooth-Shift
CbSn1 6 CpSn1 Retaining Rough-Shift
Example 8 Centring Theory (adapted from Brennan et al., 1987, p. 157)
Brennan drives an Alfa Romeo.
Cf= fBrennan, Alfa Romeog, Cp = Brennan
She drives too fast.
centering : Cb = Brennan, Cf = fBrennang, Cp = Brennan, Continuing, she = Brennan
Friedman races her on weekends.
Cb = Brennan, Cf = fFriedman, Brennan, weekendsg, Cp = Friedman, Retaining, her =
Brennan
She often beats her.
Cb = Friedman, Cf= f?, ?g, Cp = ?, Shifting, she = ?, her = ?
Example 9 Extended Theory (from Brennan et al., 1987, p. 157)
Brennan drives an Alfa Romeo.
Cf= fBrennan, Alfa Romeog, Cp = Brennan
She drives too fast.
Cb = Brennan, Cf= fBrennang, Cp = Brennan, Continuing, she = Brennan
Friedman races her on weekends.
Cb = Brennan, Cf = fFriedman, Brennan, weekendsg, Cp = Friedman, Retaining, her =
Brennan
She often beats her.
Cb=Friedman,Cf= fFriedman, Brennang,Cp=Friedman, Smooth-Shift, she= Friedman,
her = Brennan
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2.3.2 Based on dialogue moves: Reichman (1985)
This theory completes Reichman’s global focus approach (see Section 2.2.5). Each focus space,
which contains all the elements in global focus, is divided into four categories. These categories
correspond to dierent levels of local focus. Depending on these levels, entities will have dierent
realizations. The levels are described in Table 6 along with their eect on realization (called mode in
the table). The rules governing the attribution of focus level to the dierent entities are based on
those of Sidner (1979). Here are the most important (Reichman, 1981, p. 73):
. the subject of a sentence, of a there-insertion14 clause, of a cleft, pseudo-cleft or topicalised
clause15, is assigned a high focus level;
. a non subject referenced by name is assigned a medium focus level;
. a non subject referenced by description is assigned a low focus level;
. an entity referenced by name after a previous reference by description is assigned a high focus
level;
. if an entity’s high focus level assignment is usurped by another entity then the old high focus
constituent is reassigned a medium focus level.
An important dierence though between this theory and Sidner’s theory is the recognition of the
global focus shifts’ influence on the local focus. Changes in global focus level cause local focus
changes. For example, ‘‘initial focus level assignments to entities in a digression space, which were
previously mentioned in the context that this space interrupted, are carried over from that space’’
(Reichman, 1985, p. 75) since the entities are still fresh in the mind of the dialogue participants. On
the other hand, closing a space results in ‘‘the removal of all elements from focus, which is reflected
in their reassignment to a zero focus level’’ (Reichman, 1985, p. 82) since the elements in a closed
focus space are not supposed to be spoken about again.
2.3.3 Based on semantics: Schank (1977)
The theory presented by Schank deals with semantic coherence between sentences. It is based on the
dialogue participants’ perception of the relations between topics.
As in Sidner’s theory, the focus is defined by a relation between two sentences. A first sentence
defines a focus set composed of the objects, persons, locations, actions, states and time mentioned in
it. A second sentence modifies that set in two ways. First, a subset of the initial set, called the reduced
old topic, is extracted. It represents the concepts that are common to the two sentences. Secondly, a
new set is created. This second set, called the new topic, represents the new concepts that have been
introduced in the second sentence. The speaker has then a choice, when continuing the discourse, to
pick the new focus in either set. The speaker can maintain the old focus by choosing to discuss an
element of the reduced old topic or shift the conversation to an element of the new topic. Even when
Table 6 Focus levels (from Reichman, 1981, p. 120)
Mode Focus level Example
Pronominal High Your having called him up.
Name Medium Your having called Mark up.
Description Low Your having called your son up.
Implicit Zero Your having called.
14An ‘‘there-insertion’’ sentence has the following form: There is NP. For example, ‘‘There is a research group
that works on knowledge-based systems’’ is a there-insertion sentence.
15A ‘‘topicalised’’ clause is a clause in which one constituent has been placed unexpectedly at the start. For
example, ‘‘To John I gave the strawberries’’ is a topicalised clause with subject ‘‘John’’.
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maintaining the old focus, the speaker will have to acknowledge the new topic, since ignoring it
would be certainly considered as very impolite. The acknowledgement can been done for example by
rephrasing the old focus from the new focus point of view. In all cases, the new sentence provides a
list of focuses that will be used to redefine the reduced old focus and new topic. The discourse can
therefore be modelled by a binary tree, where each node represents a sentence and the two branches
represent the maintain focus choice and the focus shift choice respectively. If the conversation runs
into problems, e.g. the topic becomes uninteresting, a speaker can jump back to a previous point of
choice in the discourse and develop another branch of the tree. Such moves are usually marked in
the dialogue by cue words (Schank, 1977, p. 428).
The main issue of the Schank theory is the process of selecting the new possible topics based on
the reduced old topic, i.e. what are the shifts allowed in the dialogue? Schank proposes to associate
conversation/associational categories with each concept. These categories describe the elements that
are related to a concept and their level of interest. For example, ‘‘cocaine’’ and ‘‘buy’’ have the
conversation/associational categories given in Table 7. These categories can be viewed as putting
interesting items in implicit focus (see Section 2.2.1). Based on these categories, the speaker can
select an interesting shift in the conversation. In Example 10, the speaker realises that a major
problem in having some cocaine is to get it (the value of the availability category is ‘‘hard to get’’).
Therefore an interesting question is to find out where a dealer can be found (‘‘find a dealer’’ being
the value of the enable category).
On the other hand, Example 11 seems odd since the actor of a buy action is usually not important
(the value of the actor category for buy is nil).
The main problem with this theory is the necessity to have conversation/associational categories
for each possible concept that can be spoken about in a discourse. Moreover, the value of these
categories may vary from one person to the other, depending on their cultural background.
Table 7 Conversation/associational categories (from Schank, 1977, pp. 433, 438)
COCAINE
FUNCTION get high RESULT get stoned
PRICE middle ENABLE find a dealer
OWNER nil USER nil
AVAILABILITY hard to get PROBLEM illegal
BUY
SCRIPT shopping ASSOC nil
RESULT own ACTOR nil
EFFECT nil OBJ nil
FREQUENCY high UNUSUAL 2
Example 10 (from Schank, 1977, p. 432)
I just got some cocaine.
Where did you find a dealer?
Example 11 (from Schank, 1977, p. 439)
I just bought a new car.
I know someone else who buys things.
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2.3.4 Based on domain: McCoy and Cheng (1991)
The theory of McCoy and Cheng is somewhat similar to that of Schank. A first sentence puts an
element into focus. Depending on the nature of that element (object, action, etc.) certain focus shifts
are allowed as shown in Table 8. The speaker selects one of these shifts and puts a new element in
focus. Depending on the nature of this new element and on the previous dialogue history, new shifts
will be allowed. This process continues for the rest of the discourse. In this approach, the focuses are
organised as a tree, called the focus tree: nodes represent the focus of sentences and arcs represent
shifts between them. The topic at the current point in the dialogue is the list of focuses from the node
representing the current sentence up to the root node of the tree. That is to say: the topic is the
current focus seen in the perspective of the preceding dialogue. As in Schank’s theory, the speaker
has the possibility to stop developing the current node and instead expend a previous node. In that
case, the speaker will have to mark this move in the dialogue so that hearer can understand how the
discourse is evolving, i.e. the marks needs to be more and more explicit as the dialogue deviates from
its normal flow. Such marks may be cue words, tense shift, anaphora usage or pronoun shifting.
McCoy and Cheng do not explain how cue words should be chosen for marking shifts (see Section
4.4 for related work on cue words).
2.3.5 Summary
Three classes of theories can be distinguished from the presentation (see Table 1):
. Those based on dialogue moves and sentence construction.
. Those based on dialogue participant’s beliefs.
. Those based on real world organisation.
Each kind of theory is incomplete by itself: for example, current theories based on sentence form
need to be complemented by some semantic checker (see Section 2.3.1) and theories based on
semantic relations do not explain how the sentences are organised. Bridging the gap between the
theories seems necessary to obtain a general theory of focus. Another issue that remains largely
unexplained is the relation between local and global focus. Reichman’s theory is an interesting
attempt at integrating these two focuses. However, more work needs to be done to understand the
influence between these two phenomena. Finally, the relation between focus and belief is still a
major problem because it requires participants to share the same frame of reference.
2.4 Global and local focuses revisited
From the preceding presentations, we can notice several dierences between local and global focus.
They reflect the fact that the local focus is concerned with consecutive sentence coherence, while the
global focus is concerned with discourse part coherence. In particular:
. At any point, only one thing can be in local focus. On the other hand, the global focus may
contain several things.
Table 8 Candidate focus shifts (from McCoy and Cheng, 1991, p. 112)
Type Focus shift candidates
Object . attributes of the object,
. actions the object plays a prominent role in (e.g. is actor of)
Attribute objects which have the attribute, more specific attribute
Setting . objects involved in the setting
. actions which typically occur in the setting
Action . actor, object, etc., of the action – any participant role
. purpose (goal) of action, next action in some sequence, sub-actions, specialisations of the action
Event actions which can be grouped together into the event
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. Evolution of the local focus is restricted by sentence form and general knowledge constraints.
How the global focus evolves is restricted by dialogue goals and moves.
. The local focus evolution is marked in the dialogue by linguistic phenomena such as anaphora.
Evolution of the global focus is usually marked in the dialogue by cue words. Anaphora can also
be used to mark a global shift since reference to a concept in a stacked focus space can cause this
space to become active again.
The distinction between global and local focus is summarised in Table 9.
3 Applications
In this section we describe some practical applications of the notion of focus. These applications are
related to our research on dialogues in requirements elicitation systems. In this kind of dialogue, it is
of the utmost importance to keep users interested in the dialogue while presenting what the system is
doing. Using focus theories, it is possible to know what information should, or should not, be
presented and when to present it.
For example, local focus theories (see Section 2.3.1) can be used to improve text generation. Here
are two examples demonstrating this.
Consider Example 7 again (repeated here for convenience). Suppose that the first two sentences
have already been produced and that we want to say that Mike was studying for his driver’s test.
Should ‘‘Mike’’ be realised by a pronoun or not, i.e. should we use sentence (c) as it is in Example or
can we say ‘‘He was studying for his driver’s test’’? If we chose the latter option, rule 1 of the
centering theory would put a preference on interpreting ‘‘he’’ as being the focus of sentence (b), i.e.
John. Therefore, the realisation of Mike by a pronoun is impossible.
Now suppose that only the first sentence has already been produced and that we want to add to
sentences (b) and (c) that John has been working very hard recently. How should we organise the
text? Since we want to speak about Mike in sentence (c) and the only sentence putting Mike in the
potential focus list is sentence (b), these two sentences should stay together. As a result we have to
introduce our new information immediately, producing the following text:
a. John has been acting quite odd.
a'. He has been working hard recently and is quite tired.
b. He called up Mike yesterday.
c. Mike was studying for his driver’s test.
Table 9 Distinction between global focus and local focus
Global focus Local Focus
Deal with High-level coherence Consecutive sentences coherence
Contain Several elements One element
Shifts mainly constrained by Dialogue goals and moves Sentence structure
Shifts mainly marked by Cue words and Anaphora Anaphora
Example 7 (adapted from Grosz et al., 1995, p. 214)
a. John has been acting quite odd.
b. He called up Mike yesterday.
c. Mike was studying for his driver’s test.
d. He was annoyed by John’s call.
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Focus theories have been used in various applications (e.g. see Dalle (1992); Huang (1994a,b);
Mellish et al. (1998); Mittal et al. (1998); Reed and Long (1997a,b); Reed et al. (1997)) for recent
applications). In this section we first present two applications where the notion of focus is applied to
the production of multi-sentential explanations. For this kind of explanation, focus rules need to be
applied to produce coherent texts of high-quality. Otherwise, the explanations are no better than the
series of disconnected sentence-long utterances of early systems. The two applications we review
present information contained in databases to users. This domain is one in which several focus
theories have been applied with relative success. It represents the main application domain of focus
theories in natural language generation. Then we describe the application of the notion of focus to
create collaborative agents with dialogue processing capabilities. These agents are used to help
system users carrying out tasks. This application shows that the focus theories can be applied to
more interactive domains than the production of explanations, and gives some hints for the next
generation of applications using focus.
Since the notions of global and local focus explain only partially the coherence of discourse, they
are often used in conjunction with other theories of discourse. We pay particular attention to
describing the integration of the notion of focus with such other techniques.
3.1 Schema-based: (McKeown, 1985b)
The aim of this application is to answer users’ questions about the content of a database. An
example of an answer generated by the system is given in Table 10. The system constrains the text
generation by applying global and local focus rules when using predefined answer schemata.
More precisely, the system starts by selecting a set of schemata that can be used to answer the
question of the user. Each schema corresponds to a strategy to answer the question. Examples of
schemata are given in Table 11.
At the same time, the system collects all the knowledge it has on the particular topic of the
question by querying its database. Finally, the system finishes this first step by selecting a unique
schema from the set of schemata based on the available information from the database. Therefore,
at the end of this step, the system has selected a strategy to present its answer and it has partitioned
the knowledge that will be used for this presentation, i.e. it has set the global focus of the answer.
The second step consists in actually producing the answer in a coherent way, i.e. in respecting
local focus constraints. In each schema, choice points enable the system to vary its presentation.
Table 10 ‘‘What is a ship’’ (from McKeown, 1985a, p. 30)
What is a ship?
1. A ship is a water-going vehicle that travels on the surface. 2. Its surface-going capabilities are provided by the
DB attributes DISPLACEMENT and DRAFT. 3. Other DB attributes of the ship include MAXIMUM
SPEED, PROPULSION, FUEL (FUEL CAPACITY and FUEL TYPE), DIMENSIONS, SPEED DEPEN-
DENT RANGE and OFFICIAL NAME. 4. The DOWNES, for example, has MAXIMUM SPEED of 29,
PROPULSION of STMTURGRD, FUEL of 810 (FUEL CAPACITY) and BNKR (FUEL TYPE),
DIMENSIONS of 25 (DRAFT), 46 (BEAM), and 438 (LENGTH) and SPEED DEPENDENT RANGE of
4200 (ECONOMIC RANGE) and 2200 (ENDURANCE RANGE).
Table 11 Examples of schemata (from McKeown, 1985a)
Schema Use
identification used to provide a definition
attributive used to illustrate a particular point about a concept
compare and contrast used to describe something by contrasting a positive point against a negative one
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Therefore, the system is able to select a presentation based on the available knowledge and on the
preceding utterances. The rules used by McKeown to make this selection are the following:
. Changing the current focus to a potential focus as defined in Sidner’s theory (see Section 2.3.1)
should be preferred to maintaining the focus. Indeed, if the potential focus is not presented
immediately, the system would have to re-introduce it at a later point, which might be dicult
(McKeown, 1985b, p. 64).
. Maintaining the current focus should be preferred to shifting back to a stacked focus. Indeed, it is
better to present a topic completely before going back to a previous one, otherwise the topic
would have to be re-introduced (McKeown, 1985b, p. 66).
. If several shifts are still possible, select the new topic which is most semantically related to the
current focus (McKeown, 1985b, p. 67).
We now show on the text of Table 10 how the two steps apply. Suppose that the user asks what is a
ship. The system, based on its available knowledge and presentation strategies, selects the
identification schema. At the same time the knowledge that is relevant to the schema is selected
from the database. This sets the global focus of the explanation: only the information in the relevant
knowledge pool can be presented. The first two actions of the schema are the identification of the
concept to explain and the choice between providing an analogy, a constituency, an attributive, a
piece of evidence or a particular-illustration phrase (see Table 12). The first action results in the first
sentence of the answer describing a ship as a water-going vehicle. To carry out the second action, the
system must apply the focus constraints since several focus shifts are possible. The particular-
illustration move is ruled out because it requires information not included in the relevant knowledge
pool. To choose between the remaining shifts, the system applies the local focus rules. All the
available moves would lead to focus on the ship except for the evidence move which makes
information on the ‘‘surface-going capabilities’’ salient16. Since the surface-going capabilities are a
member of the potential focus list, this shift is preferred to the others and the system describes these
capabilities in the second sentence of the answer. The system then goes through the rest of the
schema applying the focus rules at all the choice points.
3.2 Based on RST: (Hovy and McCoy, 1989)
Hovy uses RST relations to generate text (Hovy, 1988, 1991). RST relations are relations that hold
between parts of a text (Mann and Thompson, 1987). Examples of such relations are: elaboration
when one part gives some more information on the other, or evidence when one part gives reasons to
believe the other. Hovy considers text generation as achieving a communication goal and the RST
relations as operators that can be used to realise this goal. Each relation is defined by its intended
eect and its constraints on the two parts of the discourse it links. These constraints can be seen as
sub-goals that must be achieved for the relation to hold. By using a planner, the system can then find
Table 12 Partial identification schema (based on McKeown, 1985a, pp. 12, 19–20)
Identification schema
Identification (class & attribute/function)
{Analogy/Constituency/Attributive}*
Particular-illustration/Evidence+
. . .
‘{ }’ indicates optionality, ‘/ ’ indicates alternatives, ‘+’ indicates that the item may appear 1 to n times and ‘* ’
indicates that the item is optional and may appear 0 to n times.
16For each fact that could be chosen by a move, a default focus indicates what is most likely to be focused on.
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a plan that will achieve the communication goal and generate the corresponding discourse. This can
be viewed as an improvement over McKeown’s approach where predefined schemata are used to
generate the text. In Hovy’s approach, the schemata are created by the planner, which oers more
flexibility.
A problem with this approach is that achieving a discourse goal is only one part of generating a
discourse. Coherence must be taken into account (Hovy and McCoy, 1989; Hovy, 1993). This is
where focus rules can be used to constrain the text produced by the planner so that it is coherent.
The focus approach taken by Hovy is that of McCoy and Cheng (see Section 2.3.4): a focus tree is
constructed in parallel to the RST relation tree created by the planner. Focus rules are then applied
at two points in the generation of the text. They are first applied to limit the generation. By default,
the planner tries to insert as much information as it can in the text. However, adding information
can sometimes make the discourse incoherent. Focus rules are used to restrict the growth of the text
by constraining the information that can be added. A new node is added to a node in the RST plan
only if it is allowed by the corresponding node in the focus tree. The second point where focus rules
are applied is in the ordering of the nodes in the plan. As explained at the beginning of this section, a
RST relation links two parts of a text. These two parts can be ordered in one way or the other, e.g.
an evidence can be presented before or after the phrase it supports17. Therefore, focus rules can be
used to improve the text coherence by choosing between the possible text part orderings.
By applying focus rules to the generation of text, Hovy observed some improvement in the text
quality. Two texts generated respectively without and with focus constraints are presented in Table
13. Readiness is an attribute of being en route. It is therefore better, based on the focus tree, to
introduce the readiness when speaking about the destination of Knox rather than separately.
A similar planning approach using RST relations was taken in the EES project (Moore and
Swartout, 1991; Paris, 1991). Although focus rules were not used to constrain the text generation, in
this project the notion of focus was employed to interpret follow-up questions to the text presented.
3.3 Based on dialogue intentions: Collagen (Rich and Sidner, 1997)
Collagen is an application-independent toolkit used to implement collaborative interface agents
with discourse processing capabilities. These agents help the users of a system by conversing with
them and studying their actions. The agents can act themselves directly on the system. They have
access to a database of application-dependent plans that can be applied to the system to carry out
some goals. We focus here on their dialogue capabilities.
Collagen agents decompose a dialogue into segments according to the Grosz and Sidner global
focus theory (see Section 2.2.3). Each segment is therefore associated with its intention and the
entities in focus during its realisation. Segments are put into a stack when they begin and are popped
when they finish. Based on this decomposition and on the plans they have access to, agents propose
actions to be performed. To carry out this task, the discourse generation algorithm produces an
17This is not completely true. RST relations place preferences on the order in which the two parts should be
presented (Mann and Thompson, 1987, p. 16).
Table 13 Texts generated without and with focus constraints (from Hovy and McCoy, 1989)
RST Generated Navy
Knox is en route to Sasebo. It is at 79N 18E heading SSW. It is C4. It will arrive 4/24, and will load for four
days.
Joint RST and Focus Generated Navy text
With readiness C4, Knox is en route to Sasebo. It is at 79N 18E heading SSW. It will arrive 4/24 and will load
for four days.
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agenda of prioritised actions that would contribute to the current Discourse Segment Purpose
(DSP). The priority is computed thanks to the focus of attention (among other factors). For
example, if objects used in the action considered are already known, this action will receive a high-
priority. Collagen agents therefore ensure that the action proposed is always coherent with the
current user preoccupations.
Collagen agents also make use of the same mechanism to reduce the need for natural language
understanding. Rather than tackling unrestricted natural language inputs, the agents propose a
dynamic set of inputs to the users. This set is computed from the current discourse context and the
possible actions that the user can do in the given situation. The agent-user interactions are therefore
adapted to the current needs of the user and are easy to understand since they follow dialogue rules.
This approach, although less powerful than having a fully-fledged natural language understanding
module, seems cost-eective and well-adpated with the idea of having a focus toolkit ready to be
used in a variety of applications.
An example of agent-user communication is given in Table 14. The agent and the user are
trying to schedule a trip using an application displaying a map and computing the possible
itineraries.
3.4 Summary
The main observation of this section is that, in limited forms, the notion of focus can be
implemented. It can provide useful rules to select how information is presented. It can also be
integrated with other theories or techniques such as RST relations. However, a second observation
is that in order to work every implementation requires ad hoc solutions to un-resolved problems in
its focus mechanism. This is for example the case with McKeown’s additional rules to constrain the
focus shifts by preferring a potential focus over the current focus and the current focus over stacked
focuses (see Section 3.1)18. This is due to the fact that focus theories have been mainly created for
text interpretation and not text generation. Generation requires more constraints than interpreta-
tion because the system has to make a choice about the possible focus shifts rather than just
recognising them.
4 Remaining issues
As we have seen in the previous section, the theories of focus are not complete. Some ad hoc
solutions must be implemented to obtain working systems. For example, presentation strategies
such as those used by McKeown are needed to supplement focus theories.
Table 14 Collagen agent dialogue (adapted from Rich and Sidner, 1997)
USER: Propose scheduling a trip.
AGENT: OK.
(User identifying route of scheduling a trip as San Francisco to Dallas to Boston)
USER: Add San Francisco to the route.
USER: Add Dallas to the route, allowing 97 itineraries.
USER: Add Boston to the route, allowing 100+ itineraries.
AGENT: How should a trip on the route be scheduled?
USER: Propose scheduling on the route via working forward.
USER: What should be done next?
AGENT: Propose you work on San Francisco to Dallas leg.
. . .
18These rules could be considered as not just ad hoc rules but as general principles. (They are indeed used in
various systems.) However we consider them as ad hoc because they are not yet part of a theory of focus.
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In this section, we review problems that remain to be solved to obtain a complete and applicable
theory of focus. The integration with other discourse theories is particularly important. Another
problem is the actual implementation of the theories: choices have to be made to obtain computable
models of the theories.
4.1 How many relations?
Many focus theories are based on relations such as dominance and satisfaction-precedence (see
Section 2.2.3), dialogue moves (see Section 2.2.5) or semantic links (see Section 2.3.3). An issue that
must be considered is the evaluation of the advantages and drawbacks of having very few or very
many relations (Hovy andMaier, 1992; Knott andDale, 1996). Adding relations allows finer grained
theories of focus. For example, the richer set of relations in Reichman’s theory allows a more precise
classification of cue words than in Grosz’s theory. However, too many additions can result in
superfluous complexity. For example, there is not much point in dierentiating many relations if
they are not expressed by dierent means in the dialogue. More research on this issue is needed.
4.2 User modelling and focus
Theories of focus are only one aspect to be considered in text generation. Another important one
is user modelling. Not only should the text be coherent but it also should be of interest to its
readers (Kok, 1991; Kobsa, 1993). A user model would allow the system to produce the right
amount of information expressed with the right vocabulary. For example, a user model could
restrict the global focus by eliminating the knowledge that a user already knows. This would result
in an answer centred on the points the user is ignorant about. A user model could also complement
the local focus rules in choosing between competing focus shifts, again depending on what the user
is interested in.
User modelling can also be used to take into account the users’ beliefs or the perspective they take
on a topic (McCoy, 1988). These aspects have a strong influence on the focus (see Section 2.2.1).
Their integration is therefore necessary to produce high-quality texts.
4.3 Knowledge representation and focus
An issue related to the question of the number of relations is the question whether a dedicated
knowledge representation should be used to apply the focus rules. If the relations used by the rules
are equivalent or can be deduced from the representation used to represent the data, a unique
representation is sucient. This is for example the case for McKeown’s database interface (see
Section 3.1). In this application the information in the database is sucient to determine the focus
relation between the data. If this is not the case, a separate representation needs to be created. This
has some drawbacks, such as the replication of information, but also some advantages beyond the
capability of applying the focus rules. Indeed, it is probable that the new representation based on a
linguistic theory will be compatible with other existing linguistic representations such as an upper-
model19 (Bateman, 1990, 1991). This would help in the generation of the text (McKeown and
Swartout, 1988, pp. 25–32). The need for a dedicated representation depends on the data
represented as well as the focus theory used. Evaluation of the advantages and drawbacks of
having a dedicated knowledge representation is therefore needed.
4.4 Cue words
Cue words have been recognised as playing a major role in dialogue (see Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.5). In
particular, they help the dialogue interpretation process by pointing out focus shifts. However, little
19An upper-model is an ontology based on linguistic principles.
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work has been done in determining when cue words should be used to mark focus shifts and how to
select them. Cohen (1984, 1987) proposes that cue words are used:
. to specifically re-direct the attention of the hearer to an earlier part of the dialogue. An example
of such a cue word is returning to:
. to indicate how the following utterances are related to the current focus. Examples include first or
second to introduce a parallel focus and in particular to introduce a more specific subject.
This is confirmed with the cue words proposed by the dierent focus theories.
Cohen then states that these two types of cue words can be used either to ease the dialogue
interpretation, in which case they are optional or to allow an interpretation that would be otherwise
impossible in which case they are mandatory. An interpretation is considered to be impossible
without cue words if another one exists which requires less eort. (The calculation of the amount of
eort needed to interpret a dialogue depends on the dialogue theory used.) The further the intended
interpretation is from the least costly one, the stronger the use of cue words needs to be.
This is similar to the proposition made by McCoy and Cheng (see Section 2.3.4), who propose to
use cue words when the focus does not closely follow the path predicted by their rules.
This issue was also alluded to by Linde and Goguen (1978). In particular they propose to classify
the strength of cue words on the following criteria:
. The more a cue word looks like a sentence, i.e. the more independent it is, the stronger it is.
. Cue words in front of sentences are stronger than those placed within sentences.
. The longer and more explicit a cue word is, the stronger it is.
For example, the cue in the first sentence of Table 15 is stronger than the cue in the second. It can
then be used to mark a bigger deviation from the expected flow of discourse.
In spite of these pieces of work, the use of cue words, especially in text generation, is still not fully
understood. Systematic work like Moser and Moore (1996) and Knott and Dale (1996) may shed
light on this issue.
4.5 Internal and external phenomena
Most theories of global focus are based on phenomena that are ‘‘external’’ to the dialogue: task
structure, speaker’s intentions. Much less attention has been paid to the influence of ‘‘internal’’
phenomena that can influence the dialogue. For example, if I say, during the elicitation of
information on a research group, ‘‘A research group involves its researchers, its projects and its
publications’’, there is an expectation that the dialogue will deal with these three points. More
generally, the mention of a list of elements in a dialogue seems to cause a shift to each element in the
rest of the dialogue20. More research is also needed to determine what are the internal phenomena
that can take place in the dialogue, their eects and their relations with external factors.
4.6 How is the information put into focus?
As mentioned in Section 2.2.1, the global focus usually contains elements present in the discourse as
well as implicit elements. The latter are used to determine if a new phrase appearing in the text is
20We have noticed this phenomenon in elicitation dialogues about research groups. Sometimes, when no
information about an element has to be elicited, the element is just put into focus before being immediately
popped (‘‘Well, in fact we do not need to speak about this’’). This shift seems to be necessary to fulfil the
expectation set by the mention of the element in the list.
Table 15 Cue word strength (Linde and Goguen, 1978, p. 238)
Strong cue word: On the other hand, we have to. . .
Weak cue word: We also have to. . .
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related to the current focus or not. If it is the global focus remains unchanged. If not, the global
focus is shifted to the new topic. Therefore, an important problem is to know what should be
included in implicit focus. Including too few elements would result in numerous unnecessary focus
shifts whereas including too many elements would preclude real focus shifts. Some theories propose
domain and culture dependent solutions, e.g. Schank’s conversation/associational categories, while
others propose domain-independent rules, e.g. Cheng and McCoy’s candidate focus shifts. More
research needs to be carried out to determine what should be considered in implicit focus. This
would also give some insights on the local focus and global focus boundary: when is a shift local and
when is it global? Moreover, it is important to know how to interpret partial or incomplete
references. Should they be considered as referring to elements in (explicit or implicit) focus or should
they be considered as being new elements, possibly shifting the focus? This problem is similar to
deciding what is new or given in a dialogue (Clark and Haviland, 1977). Clark proposes that a piece
of information is considered given if the listener can build ‘‘an inferential bridge [to it] from
something already known’’. Clark does not have however firm suggestions on how a bridge is built.
More research needs to be carried out on this topic too.
4.7 How does the focus evolve?
Quite often, focus rules restrict what can be said next but a choice remains to be made between the
possible developments. This is why additional rules have to be created when generating text.
McKeown uses additional focus constraints and schemata (see Section 3.1) and Hovy uses RST
relations (see Section 3.2). Taking into account the intentions of the system and those of the users as
well as who has the initiative in the dialogue could also restrict the generation process (Smith, 1996).
Research should be carried out to determine if a general theory can explain these dierent
approaches and point out their commonalities.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented the notion of focus. We have described various theories explaining
this notion. We have classified them into two groups depending on the level of focus they explain
and we have presented the information they use to predict the focus. Then we presented actual
applications of the theories in two domains: presentation of database data and cooperative agent
dialogue. Finally, we described remaining issues in the understanding of the notion of focus. To
conclude, we can summarise the current state of the art and the expected evolution of focus use in a
few points:
. Theories of focus explain a large number of focus related linguistic phenomena. Problems, such
as the relation between local focus and global focus, remain but the theories are suciently
mature to allow actual applications of the notion.
. The application of the notion of focus raises engineering problems: how to represent the
information used by the focus rules, how many relations are needed, etc. Current approaches
have developed ad hoc solutions to these problems. As experience is gained on the use of the
notion of focus, guidelines should appear and the development of applications may be easier.
. The notion of focus will certainly be used in conjunction with other techniques. It may become
part of a set of tools used to produce high-quality interaction with users. Such an approach is
exemplified by the Collagen toolkit that implements focus rules and is used to create user-system
interfaces.
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